Mr. Chairman,

Russia constructively participated in the activities of the Working Group on further strengthening the review process of the NPT (Vienna, 24-28 July 2023) on the eve of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference and was committed to elaborating specific recommendations.

However, the purpose of strengthening the NPT review process turned out to be merely declaratory, while the main task was to impose transparency and accountability measures on nuclear-weapon States and to convert the NPT review process into a means of oversight and coercion. The Working Group failed to deliver recommendations adopted by consensus due to the narrow and maximalist approach of certain countries, who, instead of agreeing on a wide range of recommendations to strengthen the NPT review process, opted to wait till the last minute to table proposals concerning exclusively the matters of transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States and tried to impose them on the rest of the members of the Group as an outcome. However, that did not work. It is noteworthy that those who prevented the adoption of recommendations reflecting the lowest common denominator included the countries that had initiated the establishment of the Group. This only proves that not every delegation pursued the strengthening the NPT review process as their main objective. As a result, the members of the Group only wasted their time, efforts and resources.

The mandate of the Working Group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty expired, and there has been no decision to extend it. Now these matters can be discussed exclusively as a cluster 3-specific issue among other issues, which include the NPT universalization, withdrawal from the Treaty, etc., as they were discussed before. In addition, the deliberations on the strengthening of the NPT review process should not be confined to discussing the nuclear-weapon States' transparency and accountability. Transparency and other confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves, but rather a means of addressing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. What is more, it should be remembered that Article VI of the NPT puts nuclear disarmament within the context of the general and complete disarmament. Hence, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States should report on the implementation of their disarmament obligations.

We believe that recommendations that have not been approved by consensus cannot be viewed as a workable basis for decisions to be adopted within the current NPT review cycle. The outcome of discussions under cluster 3-specific issue should be considered together with the rest of the proposals that will be tabled at the 2026 Review Conference and assessed, inter alia, in terms of their influence on the Treaty review process and the NPT in general.

As for Russia's transparency measures, we have continuously and within admissible limits informed the international community of our steps to implement our NPT obligations. As part of the Treaty review process Russia, like other N5 countries, submits national reports prepared according to the agreed common reporting framework. The reporting framework agreed by the N5 in 2013 remains relevant and needs no adjustments at the moment. Each nuclear-weapon State can independently determine acceptable transparency limits depending on the strategic realities and its national security interests.

One should have in mind that our strategic nuclear forces have already become target of Ukrainian attacks, and we are confident that Kiev, which absolutely lacks legal personality, could not make this decision on its own. NATO obviously had a hand in this. An aggressive, bloodthirsty, illegitimate nuclear military bloc, NATO has put the world on the brink of a global nuclear war with the only purpose of checking Russia's reaction to its aggressive behaviour. Such steps on the part of NATO should receive proper assessment and response of all countries interested in ensuring their security.

Going back to the matters of transparency and accountability, we believe that all countries should contribute to this process. At the same time, there is a number of States that are considered non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, yet they are in fact NATO members, they take part in nuclear sharing, and nuclear weapons have been placed in the territories of some of them and can at any moment be placed in the territories of others. It is these States who should exercise maximum transparency and report in as great detail as possible their nuclear infrastructure, its use and their plans for the future.

In conclusion, I would like to comment on one delegation's remark referring to possible adoption of decisions – so far, only procedural decisions – by vote. Any non-consensus decisions will remain non-binding for the States that have not supported them. Furthermore, abusing the voting procedure will most likely make a number of States doubt whether to continue participating in the review process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.